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The Good is the idea by participation in which all other things have ideas, or are related to ideals. The man has time to calculate from experience or precept, half unwittingly it may be, whether it will be better to grant himself this pleasure or to forgo it. The result of this act of suspension, whether it end in permission or negation, and whether the judgment of ultimate pleasure and pain be right or wrong, is the virtue of temperance, and with it comes the feeling of happiness.

That is the dialectical certainty, what we know by immediate and incontrovertible evidence. If his judgment was led to veto that desire, it will seem to him that his act of restraint was merely the choice in its place of this more desirable image; the love of the Idea has driven out the baser love of the flesh. If his judgment granted the desire as good, then it will seem to him as if this desired object were indeed beautiful, but beautiful only as a shadow or receptacle of the overflowing loveliness of the Idea. Good in itself but bad exegesis. Plato is not interested in the trend of —20 or in the perhaps opposite trend of James that faith and works cannot be disjoined.

How otherwise could it be in a doctrine wherein the assurance 2: This is you at your best: Finally men will want release from such servitude; if they cannot discover the way of freedom in the law of the spirit, they will throw open the gate of the soul to the throng of invading desires, and the stoical necessity of science, save for the few exceptional minds, will remain as a theory, while in practice the mass of mankind will follow a rebellious and epicurean individualism.

Whereas to the pseudo-Platonist it appears as a positive inspiration, saying yes to his desires and emotions. Goethe unwittingly was giving expression to the everlasting formula of pseudo-Platonism when he put into the mouth of Mephistopheles the fateful words: The moment these terms are reversed, what is reverenced as the spirit becomes a snare instead of a monitor: Eliot, just appointed president of the university, in Harvard must expand with the country, must save something for the advancement of learning out of this scramble for wealth, or the age would pass her by, and the ghosts of Dunster, Leverett, and Kirkland would rise to reproach her.

There were plenty of rival universities ready to carry the caduceus, if Harvard slowed up or stumbled. A Synthesis of Cultures Bombay: The Ape-trial in Tennessee was no exception, but a sign of the continuity of that mentality. The witch-trials in Pennsylvania are not far in the past. Nevertheless America remains, in terms of technical progress and in oases, a modern country.

Puritanism lives on; the ideals of Voltairean enlightenment are regarded as the last word. Gott offenbart sich nur im Menschen, als Mensch. You think you are a man, but are really God dreaming that he has become human. The Ought is the potentiality of the Is. Und keiner hat ihn auf eine solche paradoxe Spitze getrieben, indem er ihn ganz in das einzelne, empirische Individuum gesetzt und gezogen hat. The volume does not appear to have been sent to Georgetown; I have not seen it. Religion was my original interest, and to substitute truth for fiction in placing human life.

Interest in a good society with friendship and beauty in it. This is all I should desire to have done. But it is only physical reality that is so remote from intuitive sympathy. The other realms are more open to inspection. This is an inexcusable mis-statement. It is a theme found. Is the number 2 a creation or a prior subsistent? Spirit is not a trope. Nature is as much the seat of values and ideals since man who is a part of nature may experience values and strive for ideals as of mechanism and blind causation. It is as thoroughly qualitative as it is quantitative, as much logical as it is physical.

The sphere of nature is the unified totality of whatever it produces and contains. All distinctions found within this universe are discoveries of its diversely qualified and related contents. This passage is excellent. The procedure is that of transcendentalism, the conclusion—agnosticism. He takes over problems bequeathed to modern philosophy by Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, and seeks an answer to those problems in terms of the assumptions common to the characteristic epistemologic inquiries of these philosophers.

The result is no more satisfactory than the conclusions arrived at by Hume or Kant or Spencer. Of course it is Descartes that I follow in my scepticism. It shows the two sides of knowledge or mind, sufficient as an entertainment but inadequate as a report. In the L of R I1 was studying the entertainment. For spirit, reflection is only a change of perspective.

Santayana transforms the ideas that intervene as a screen between the spirit and the external world into a realm of timeless universals, […]. Yes, in the sense that they become pure words and no longer, as in Locke, intervening objects, or as in Plato, supernatural powers. Words are vehicles and not obstacles to knowledge. Not a standard, since it is infinite, but a sufficient theme when the natural goal of some psychic movement. Loving all children equally is radically incompatible with natural fatherhood, but it is not incompatible with the existence of some monks in a rational society, nor with an element of charity to all in the American family.

It is a culmination concomitant with all life; but in anxious inquiry there is an element of slavery and distraction. Why not quote the text as in the L. For it would seem that if we are to take this as a serious claim to having overcome completely the necessity for distinguishing good from evil, on all levels of vital endeavor, then we are left with an evident condition. Does M imagine that beauty and love are excluded by me from the spiritual life? It is the illusion of exclusiveness, not the fact of excellence, that is to be banished from things. It is impossible to negate all ideals and to elude all interests except by death.

Ideals acquire validity in their applicability to material conduct and affairs. The spiritual man is not apart from the world; rather by his elevated and penetrating vision he is brought into closer contact with its essential and ultimate values. All the saints have been Deweyites. It leaves the field open for all sorts of fanaticisms to arise and contest for domination in the world.

This lets the cat out of the bag. In Europe there is fresh inspiration. But whereas in the earlier writings the stimulus for adopting a contemplative attitude was the confrontation of the world-view of science with that of religion, in the latest writings, it is the increased confusion of the social world, reflecting a maladjustment of political and economic forces, that gives ground for the attempt to rise to an otherworldly contemplation of essences and a complete disintoxication from moral values. Better than New York! Happiness is now sought in the free play of fancy […], the varied imaginative excursions into which are to be enjoyed in their immediacy as subjective impressions, significant as indications neither of natural conditions nor of possible moral ideals.

It is dissatisfied with any standard which is not couched as a brief absolute definition of beauty or goodness, for all persons at all times. Constant confusion of truth with true opinion or final dogma. Guy Murchie Saint Croix: The Sentinel River New York: John Middleton Murry God: Being an Introduction to the Science of Metabiology London: After the sensation of complete isolation, he describes being bathed in warm light, feeling no menace in the universe, and being part of it. The ego transferred to the non-ego: I concluded […] that Christianity was an accidental accompaniment of such experience.

Hindus, Buddhists, Mohammedans have it too. Take the primary conviction of the existence of God away from Jesus, I thought, and you have a Shakespeare. For to know what you really like means to know what you really are; and that is a matter of painful experience and slow exploration. Nothing is more classical than self-knowledge. Yet what could he have done, being rejected?

He could not deny his experience, or recant his teaching. The experience was real, the teaching was true. Had he refused to go onward, his very name might have been lost for ever. Christ would not have required him to sacrifice Keats to Jesus. To the Jesus who was real to me, Keats would have been a brother, […]. If Christ was alive, he would be with the people in the pubs. How hopelessly wrong a Protestant view of Jesus is! It would distress me greatly to be condemned to live in a universe in which an event so stupid might happen; […].

Protestants confuse the body with the world: Paul a Jew too? It was not preaching in that sense: It was assuredly not foolish nineteen hundred years ago in Galilee to believe in God. As if imagination were literal! A world which at a certain point, no matter how far distant in time, ceased for a period to belong to the natural order, is no world for me, a man of the twentieth 2: But then that would be the truly natural order.

The 20th century be damned. Intuition is not knowledge at all. It is feeling with a diversified image. Many animals are hideous 23 p , underlined and marked […] the suffering God was a tremendous creation; it came nearer to the truth of things than any religious imagination had done before: The creative newness of Jesus was inevitably death to the biological individual, but it was Life to the process as a whole. It became the focus of centuries of conscious and unconscious effort in successive generations of men: This complete Naturalism, therefore, should have the effect of precluding that extreme conflict between intellect and emotion, and the consequent paralysis of the will, upon which the mystical experience has been shown to supervene.

Brothels have maintained themselves, therefore, etc. Are you a Behaviourist! That is the central meditation of the Christian faith. And everyone who dares to meditate it, be he Christian or unbeliever, knows that in that evil there was good, in that pain joy, and in that death a victory. Good could come out of it, or could overcome it.

It was never itself good. It asks no greater sacrifice than Little Bethel or the Church of England; and it does not insult your intelligence by inviting you to become a member of a contradiction in terms—the church of England? O dear, but it is so un-English!

Brute fact, he means. Organic responses are infinitely various. They may be emotional, or intellectual, or animal. What has to be done is to recognize them clearly for what they are. They are not all compatible with one another; many of them will certainly be in open or sullen warfare with each other.

Download e-book for kindle: Ich: Individualist oder Herdentier (German Edition) by Sven Cott

Some of them will probably appear to the individual damnable and horrible, and he will be doing his utmost to hide them. His duty is to get them into consciousness. Why talk like this? Lawrence] has been instinctively aware that the attempt to decide about Jesus would be truly perturbing to himself. Whereas I am in no danger of discovering that I am like the founder of Christianity; D. He happens to be more like him than any man who has lived for the past fifty years, unless perchance it were that other anti-Christian, Friedrich Nietzsche. It is, in our description, pure and total organic contact with the real.

Goethe meant facts, or fact as observed. Why use such jargon? If the truth stared me in the face for so long, and I could not see it, perhaps it must be a difficult truth. And yet, there it is, obvious, before me; and so far as I am able to judge, I am absolutely sane. I have indeed a feeling of sanity such as I have never experienced in my life before. I was never sane before; when shall I be sane again?

All the passions create true excellence, whether their objects ever exist or not. Is this what K. But sensuality of the imagination is the sign of a temporary failure in the process of transmutation. The biological desire which was being wholly transformed into metabiological creation now asserts itself as biological desire; the imagination becomes biologically interested. This distinction, which though generally disregarded is of the utmost importance in any real examination of the vexed question of pornography, […].

Unless it awakens love, it is merely a fact and alien to us. Love alone will change fact into Truth. And this, however strange it sound, is no foolish fancy. For Love is a faculty of understanding, and unless it enters into and transmutes our knowledge of fact, we cannot really know. Unless I love the facts—or at least the essence I see in them—I do not see their beauty: Though a quarrel in the street is a thing to be hated, the energies displayed in it are fine.

The commonest Man shows a grace in his quarrel. One might describe it as the organic advance to an organic self-awareness. Poetry is the reintegration into organic unity of the would-be autonomous Mind. When the Mind, as it were, behaves as the pure instinct that it veritably is, when it becomes the willing instrument of the total organism, instead of its separated lord,—then Poetry appears.


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To love or to write poetry you must assert yourself as master of the other. They are at the core of his famous definition: If a Truth cannot Truth, but only Fact. But the Fact does not change, in order that it may become Truth; it is we who change. That would be wickedness. Only the essence which may or may not appear in the facts. Ralph Nevill Floreat Etona: Anecdotes and Memories of Eton College London: This suggests respect for truth.

A protestant who has his own historical Jesus 4 p 20 Nietzsche knew that his thought was difficult and would not be understood. Let us just see what the crowd has understood. The misunderstood great man is content to understand himself. It is rather gaia scienza. Subjectivity is too deep in N. This must also lie beyond. He thought of health and the dance. The super-man is bitterly realistic intelligent but for that very reason despises the impotent intelligentsia. But the Nazis, too, have intellectual superiority to prejudice. If the superman governs, is his superiority that of a governor or of a pure intelligence?

Benda defined the ideals of the clerc as Utopian. Utopia, sport, earnestness without seriousness. Nietzsche is often ignorant. This is a new reversal of values. Nietzsche a patron of Geneva, with Calvin and Wilson? He was a genius: True heroism consists in not fighting at all. How admirable the English were during the [Great] war, and how contemptible they are now! Absolute reversal of the truth. The control would again be taken over by the most sagacious among the poor mass-men, they would become rich, […].

In its great work of training and conditioning the ineducable masses, I thought our system was doing, on the whole, a first-rate job, and I said so publicly. As for the educable minority, they were merely casualties of the time and circumstances […]. If this is sincere it redeems the faults of this ill-tempered book.

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Confusion over what we think with what we ought to think. La cosa es horrible […]. Let another be born! La memoria sin documentos e instrumentos no vale nada. Memory without documents and records is worthless. Hoy sin cielo y sin infierno el mundo se ha hecho chico1 1 Today without heaven or hell the world has become diminished.

Liberalism would be pure intelligence if it were limited to granting minorities the right to live, provided that the chosen life of the majority were not thereby disturbed: Porque no progresaron siempre? Why did they not continue always to progress? Here you touch the live wire. No; this is pure sophistry. The heir has a lovely place of his own in his world. Inglaterra2 1 The result is that specific stupidity of the old nobles who amount to nothing, and whom no one has as yet truthfully described in their internal and tragic mechanism—their irremediable degeneration.

He reached his twentieth birthday with a sigh. When he stopped growing, he began to die. It is true that aggression unites a band that self-defence might disperse. Este estado es esencialmente fascista. Pero lo internacional—las matematicas, la religion—no es otra nacionalidad, sino una cosa espiritual or [sic] material comun a todos.

The national State in the West, insofar as it remains loyal to its authentic substance, the more directly it will purify itself into an enormous continental State. Without the United States? It is that foreign nations want to remain English, French, and German without ceasing to be Spanish. But the international idea—in mathematics, religion—does not constitute another nationality, but a spiritual or material quality common to all. Ya no puede hacerse nada con ellos si no es trascenderlos.

What do you want, child? Well, Albert Einstein displays radical ignorance about what has occurred in Spain, now, a century ago, and always. The impulse that brings him to this insolent intervention is the same impulse which for a long time has caused the universal loss of prestige of the intellectuals, and which, in their turn, it seems that now they send the world adrift for lack of spiritual power.

Allison Peers Spanish Mysticism: A Preliminary Survey London: Stories and heroisms cannot be the source of spiritual love.

George Santayana's Marginalia: A Critical Selection: Abell-Lucretius

It may be their source, but must spring from our own nature. John of the Cross. This is exactly the dialectic of Diotima reversed: Augustine said animatedly that the love of God was a weight on his soul. This is the illusion in most minds: Diego de Estella at least sees that it is a dreadful pity that it should be so. We live move and have our being in the thought of what we love. It is our secret, not our locus. In retrospect, it may look as though the intellectuals were responsible for the Dreyfus affair.

Reflection shows that intellectuals are ineffectual in bringing plans into reality, and plans that come about in history owe little to intellectual efforts. It has had enough, particularly enough of peace. True of the Germans in When we look further, we see that by they deplore the rapid deterioration of the people; and by a democratic system began, setting up and overthrowing rulers with great frequency by the power of the vox populi.

This regular feature of a decaying civilisation shows that it had certainly passed all its stages of growth and glory. Democracy is a weedy growth over among the corn. But it is itself the harvest when there is no grain grown. This informs to the indoctrinated genteel democracy in America. William Lyon Phelps Robert Browning: How to Know Him Indianapolis: New York and London: But what are they Democracy?

But what is that? Again they know in a way. It is what has made possible the sort of life they have been living, with its thousand points that affection clings to, and its thousand little grounds for gratitude. A Study of Monarchy London: Plato [Santayana of course had read the Platonic dialogues as a student at Harvard, and he lectured on Plato and Aristotle as an instructor there.

He appears to have used Jowett occasionally to correct Jowett or to crib from him. It is obvious from certain of the marginalia in Jowett that he used it in his lectures on Greek philosophy. His self-deprecation must be read with scepticism. The marginalia-count, in both the Greek and the English translation, gives some indication to the qualities of precision and philosophical interpretation that Santayana brought to his Platonic year with Jackson: A great many of the marginalia are purely linguistic and of interest mainly, or only, to students of Greek as a language.

Then, as to the names: And we must remember that different legislators will not use the same syllables. For neither does every smith, although he may be making the same instrument for the same purpose, make them all of the same iron. The form must be the same, but the materials may vary, and still the instrument may be equally good of whatever iron made, whether in Hellas or in a foreign country;—there is no difference.

To be is to have a quality: But if [a man] sees any one thing, he sees something that exists. Do you suppose that what is one is ever to be found among non-existing things? And he who hears anything, hears some one thing,—a thing which is? And he who touches anything, touches something which is one and therefore is? So, then, does not he who holds an opinion holds an opinion of some one thing?

Hermann, after Thrasyllus Volume IV. Good 2 p , para. Through this, I believe, all the mistakes of the mind are caused in all of us. So answer this question about the sophist: Is this now clear, that he is a kind of a juggler, an imitator of realities, or are we still uncertain whether he may not truly possess the knowledge of all the things about which he seems to be able to argue? It is in reply to this that they say generation participates in the power of acting and of being acted upon, but that neither power is connected with being.


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  4. And if any man has doubts about these oppositions, he must make investigations and advance better doctrines than these of ours; or if he finds pleasure in dragging words about and applying them to different things at different times, with the notion that he has invented something difficult to explain, our present argument asserts that he has taken up seriously matters which are not worth serious attention; for this process is neither clever nor difficult, […].

    When anyone, by employing his own person as his instrument, makes his own figure or voice seem similar to yours, that kind of fantastic art is called mimetic. Cf Plato on art. But what of the figure of justice and, in a word, of virtue in general? Are there not many who have no knowledge of it, but only a sort of opinion, and who try with the greatest eagerness to make this which they themselves think is virtue seem to exist within them, by imitating it in acts and words to the best of their ability?

    Plato Statesman Edited by K. Theodorus answers that Socrates is three times in his debt for the definitions of the statesman, the philosopher, and the sophist. Latin would omit the words in brackets. By Ammon, the god of Cyrene, Socrates, that is a very fair hit; and shows that you have not forgotten your geometry. I will retaliate on you at some other time, but I must now ask the Stranger, who will not, I hope, tire of his goodness to us, to proceed either with the Statesman or with the Philosopher, whichever he prefers.

    The fact that the dialogue is told on the following day excuses the wording of all the picturesque elements in the first book. It is more natural, in reciting a past scene, to describe the setting at the beginning, and to refer to it only incidentally after the discourse is well under weigh. Yet what a pity it is that the dramatic movement could not have been carried through with sentimental or superstitious arguments against the laws about women, or the doctrine of a future life.

    Socrates is not without his interesting and not too virtuous young friend. The character of Glaucon is drawn as one might draw that of a well known person, by a few occasional references to his familiar traits, not as one draws a character to be introduced for the first time and for the sake of its dramatic value, as the characters of Cephalus and Thrasymachus are introduced.

    It is given here in an example before the analysis of its essence begins. Note the open-mindedness of Cephalus, who will not be the dupe of cynicism any more than of credulity. This is a very inferior syntax to the Latin, for all its fluency. Now to this peace of mind the possession of wealth greatly contributes; and therefore I say, that setting one thing against another, of the many advantages which wealth has to give, to a man of sense this in my opinion the greatest.

    The state is a product of reason on the basis of need. And the primary need is food, etc. The correctness of this beginning cannot be too much praised. The question for the individual as for the state depends on the right balance between diversity of culture and quantity of wealth. The ideal is perhaps to divide labour and to synthesize arts; that is, to do one servile thing each, and all liberal things together. A community loses nothing by the absence of mines, if it can get its metals more cheaply by exchange: The lover of anything loves it universally, not in one example only.

    So love is hypocritical, and attributes to the accidents of the object an attraction due to its own universal and impartial hunger. So the lover of wine finds all wines pleasing. Likewise the lover of honour. The fastidious eater is not a lover of food [ but of his own whims.

    The philosopher the omnivorous learner. Who, then, are true philosophers? Those who love to look upon truth. What is Truth i.

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    Each is therefore one. So we separate sightseers from truth-lovers. Ability to do is so is rare. To know both the original and the copies is to be awake. He who knows knows something. To be in key—i. Therefore to the intermediate realm between being and not-being corresponds an intermediate perception—opinion. Science is addressed to the real, to learn its nature or its determinations. The function of knowledge is to deal with the real, to learn its determinates. In thinking you must think something. Opinion has more light than ignorance, less than science. It remains to find the object of opinion.

    Particular things have their qualities temporarily relatively and accidentally. They have and have not the attributes which are assigned to them at each moment. They are the objects of opinion, and of the lovers of sights and of miscellaneous experience. Kings should be philosophers because philosophy is the science of practical good which is the formative principle even of truth and reality. Everyone has a premonition of what would help him, but errs, and abandons conventional goods perhaps, in the hope of that uncertain perfect satisfaction.

    This, of all the gods, the sun dispenses. The inner nature or instinct, that gives direction to idealization The life of reason has two conditions The outer facts or accidents, on which the realisation of the ideal depends. These two conditions are not conceivably subordinated to the good in the same sense as the works of reason are: In this case, however, does not the problem seem farther back? The bed that has its being in the nature of things or may say was made by a god; i. This idea of the bed is one; else the two or more would be examples of a deeper nature, corollaries of a deeper function.

    The artisan makes them. The horseman possesses their Idea, for he knows their use. The Phaedo of Plato Edited by R. It is no argument, but rather a rhetorical plausibility, which Socrates, as a preacher, may well have used. But though complete in itself it utilises some of the materials of former arguments: Secondly, the whole argument has for its ultimate premiss the constancy of the sum total of existence: Why do you say that?

    Simply because you like it better so. A similar examination of the remaining arguments of the Phaedo will show that individual immortality is not fairly deducible from any of them. The same applies to the brief but pregnant demonstration in Phaedrus C foll. There the case for the eternity of soul is stated with unequalled force and clearness; but it applies to the universal soul alone, and nothing can be deduced from it regarding the permanence of particular souls.

    This seems at first sight like an assertion of the continued existence of the same personalities. A closer examination however shows that this is not the case. Plato simply means that if the whole vital force of the universe is distributed into a certain number of souls, no addition to this number is possible, else the sum total of vitality would be increased, which is inadmissible. Consistency by any other name stinks as sweet. Hence it is beside the point to ask which of the three parts is immortal: Plato is seeking to prove that soul herself is eternal, not that certain relations and functions of soul are perpetual.

    Does then the soul live at all? This is perhaps true and herein lies the explanation of the originally so pure perception of the good in Plato. Socrates replies that he is satisfying the bidding of a dream, in which he was urged to continue what he was already doing; that he wished to honor the god, and being without invention, he resorted to Aesop for material for his verse. This paradox is explained as follows. First we define death as the state of separation of soul and body. Roncaglia highlights that there is indeed some polemical verve in this stance, and we should more properly distinguish two traditions of European Enlightenment.

    This approach, following Kant, was conscious of the imperfect though ameliorable nature of human beings. We may inscribe to this tradition such influential writers as Adam Smith and David Hume. Mill was profoundly influenced by these writers as well as by the Romantic Spirit of his time, and therefore he agreed with many postulates of the nascent positivist tradition. He may have relied on deductive reasoning in political economy more weightily than Schmoller, but in the end Schmoller attacked him because his analysis was always aimed at its practical application and policy implications.

    As such, it dealt with the specific setting of the British society and economy of the day, and was much less informative on the economic analysis of other societies. Thereby he simultaneously characterizes what he perceives as the abstract character of their science assuming that economic laws are natural as well as their antisocial political implications summarized by reference to individualism. He too, despite his universal culture, is stuck in the underbrush of individualistic natural law of the abstractly radical kind typical of the eighteenth century. However, to many of them induction required much firmer foundations than what was the standard of the time, and possibly what was possible at the time.

    For this reason many scholars of the School produced works mainly belonging to the field of economic history — careful factual reconstructions and accounts rich in historical detail — without ever developing a thorough and coherent system of economic theory. Thus, Schmoller even levels against the older German historical school, a generation before his own, the accusation of founding its inferences on shaky ground: The difference between the new historical school and Roscher is that the former is more cautious in generalizing, and feels a much stronger need to shift from the polyhistoric collection of data to the specific investigation of single epochs, single populations, single economic conditions.

    This achievement was probably inspired more by academic considerations than by a definitive sense of scientific maturity from the beginning. However, he adds that in time, after years of work, he grew increasingly satisfied with his magnum opus. The other two are: Their influence spanned the other social sciences, such as history and sociology, but indeed was also the result of a more interdisciplinary cultural movement with the historical school of law, for example.

    Within economics, a similar historical and evolutionary approach — also developed in a theory of stages — may be found in Marx, among others. He suggests considering them as practicing an evolutionary institutional cultural economics, rather than a truly historical one. Caldwell replied to this provocative thesis by pointing out the sociological value of classifying most German academic economists of the time as a school headed by Schmoller. He is believed to have influenced many Bismarckian policies profoundly, but some note that the inverse also applies, that is he is not remembered as having criticized many decisions of the Prussian Empire.

    The new epoch has also taken on the destitute, languishing classes that have been mistreated for centuries. Suddenly left to their own devices and exposed to competitive struggle, these people have inevitably fallen behind at the same rate that those with greater means, the educated and propertied classes, have progressed. He thought that economic and technical progress brought with it many positive consequences, especially by raising the material standard of living of the population, but also that this process should be not only managed but even directed by the state.

    In so doing, the state was to promote morality and the conservation of any good to be found in the old social and political organization.

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    Indeed, as was common in his time, Schmoller perceived a strong correlation between poverty and immorality, along Malthusian lines. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries seemed to us the birth hour of modern states and modern national economies; and, therefore, to have been necessarily characterized by a selfish national commercial policy of a harsh and rude kind.

    One might say that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries created the modern national economies, and that the nineteenth has humanized their relations to one another. That is why Schmoller praised the advancement in living conditions for the great mass of workers brought about by capitalism. Conversely, however, every single system of property and income, no matter how many may have been known throughout the world, has succumbed over time if it no longer rests on that conviction. Starting in the s, however, the literature begins to reflect the opinion that Mill summarized the political and economic discussions of his time, and by so doing played a decisive role in the process of distancing economic theory from Ricardian doctrines.

    Evidently, this argument preliminarily requires a position on the political economy of Ricardo, about which one can distinguish two positions in the literature. One is put forward by those who share the interpretation of Ricardo proposed by Sraffa , most notably Dobb and Bharadwaj , Mill himself considered this topic central to the science of political economy: In a state of society, however, in which the industrial system is entirely founded on purchase and sale [. Almost every speculation respecting the economical interests of a society thus constituted implies some theory of Value: Indeed, several factors compound to make it difficult and possibly useless and misleading to try to produce a coherent and complete picture of the whole literary production of Mill.

    One should cite at least the very long time span over which he actively participated in the cultural debate; his own testimony in the Autobiography to having changed his mind during his lifetime for example, from the initial orthodox Benthamism to more nuanced positions affected by the Romantic movement, or with the late abandonment of the wage fund theory ; his purposeful research for the establishment of a synthesis capable of obtaining general consensus referred to above ; his writing with the aim of affecting the immediate political and cultural debate, hence certain shifts in rhetoric from one work to another; his cultivation of deeply held and articulated positions, frequently hard to summarize and straightforwardly classify into general categories or schools; finally, the possibility that in different contexts or at different times Mill may have written different, possibly contradictory, things — especially if read side by side from a contemporary standpoint.

    All these factors add to the more traditional difficulty of fully grasping the meaning of a few sentences or passages extrapolated from a text, which is particularly severe for works of political economy that are not mathematically formalized and therefore require textual interpretation.

    Moreover, we may have to consider his own initial discomfort with the attempt to synthesize the historical economic research of the time, because he believed the project to be both necessary and premature. It emerged as a reaction to extreme rationalist methodological stances, in Germany especially in the field of law and most notably constitutional law. Among the main causes of the ascent of history as a method of the other social sciences are the development of archeology and ethnography.

    Gradually, the search for causes and effects made comparative analysis look like insufficient grounds for scientific knowledge. Thus in the social sciences comparison was substituted with temporal sequence and causation. These considerations led many authors to adopt historical theories based on narratives of stages. Chronologies of stages were proposed in particular by the major exponents of the German historical school, possibly as a consequence of their distinctively multidisciplinary approach. First, they may form a thorough stage theory of a certain phenomenon or of society in general , as opposed to stages as a rhetorical device to summarize many unconnected facts.

    The historical tendency, as mentioned, is increasingly to detect causal connections and to systematize stages in an overarching evolutionist view of the phenomenon. Second, the procedure of developing analytical stages resembles that of classifying individuals as discussed in Chapter 3 and from certain points of view it may be thought of as the problem of aggregation applied to time rather than individuals.

    We may similarly distinguish two interpretations of stages among different authors: In the former case we would speak of stages as ideal types, in the latter as real types. Finally, the identification of stages may depend on a single criterion or many. Indeed, the method of identification of stages depends on the fact that stages serve different analytical aims.

    In the case of ideal types, as theorized by Weber, they are an instrument for the analysis of an issue. They need not be realistic and more than one may be necessary to understand an actual historical phenomenon moreover, stages may overlap as social change can move at different speeds in different parts of society. Schmoller refrained from developing a coherent stage theory of society. According to Schmoller, around the tenth or eleventh century most countries underwent a transformation towards a second stage of economic organization based on guilds and corporations, mainly operating in urban areas.

    The period between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries is characterized by the emergence of territorial institutions both political and economic , which, starting from the sixteenth century, evolve towards the formation of national states. Finally, with colonialism begins the epoch of a global interlinked economy. Indeed, in his major work Schmoller would typically approach a topic in three steps. First, he would provide a detailed definition of the main concepts involved, frequently relying on the history of ideas. A second reason may be that a clear definition of concepts is necessary for any measurement to take place, which is the third step in the theoretical exposition by Schmoller.

    Between the first stage of concept definition and the third of statistical portrait, Schmoller frequently develops a theory of the phenomenon by providing a historical account of its evolution. Thus, different phenomena may be better represented by different sequences of stages, both with respect to the number of stages and in their chronology.

    This plurality of sequences of stages allows Schmoller to innovate substantially on a number of topics, including the study of gender relations, as shown in Chapter 7. Adam Smith may have not been the first but he was certainly the most explicit in distinguishing the geographical division of the economy land and city from the classification of industries agriculture, industry, trade and the distribution of income rent, wages, profits , as noticed in the previous chapter.

    Within the historical method, Schmoller reaches a similar analytical improvement by applying in full the method of adopting separate periodizations for different phenomena. Indeed, it was traditional in prior literature to identify stages of social development and then try to fit any phenomena into that framework. In this account Mill, , pp. Here people live mostly on the available produce of the land. They practice fishing, hunting and collect comestible plants. They are also frequently involved in predation and war, due to their extreme dependency on aleatory external natural conditions.

    With the domestication of animals and the production of very primitive tools begins the second stage, that of nomadic pastoral populations. Flocks and herds constitute the first form of capital that it is possible to accumulate and bequest. Therefore inequality begins at this stage. Thanks to this surplus a first division of labor emerges.

    It is based on servitude of the harshest kind, given the extreme power imbalance between those who can secure survival and those who cannot. With it, innovation develops and the production of new tools allows for the shift to an agricultural economy, namely the third stage of development. Agriculture allows productivity at levels unthinkable in previous stages and it permits both rapid population growth and the creation of a large class of functionaries and personnel dependent on one or few landlords. Thus agriculture creates the conditions for the political tyranny typical of ancient populations.

    There, the prince accumulates sufficient resources to be able to and desire to make great displays of abundance, thus creating demand for large public works such as the pyramids and luxury goods. However, the development of culture, law and religion and institutions aimed at the preservation and even the increase in the current economic and political inequality, makes economic growth slow down, and population growth with it.

    The empires thus constituted enter a crisis and they become the sitting target of external populations. We now enter the Middle Ages, which bring about a new institutional framework that allows for the gradual substitution of aristocracy for the emergent class of merchants and manufacturers at the upper end of income distribution.

    Here, also as a consequence of the sedimentation of local customs and the national character, national economies and societies start diverging and the development of each country requires separate treatment. By contrast, in defining several different chronologies of stages for different domains of social evolution production techniques, political regimes, gender relations, religion, etc.

    To illustrate this point, let us consider two phenomena, A and B, assumed to evolve in time as in Figure 2. In the figure, the phenomenon A exhibits an evolution in three stages, while roughly at the same time B shifts from stage B1 to B2. While the movement from the stage A1 to A2 is here represented as an endogenous process solid line in the diagram , the later shift to A3 is made possible or facilitated dashed line by the parallel evolution of B into a new stage, producing an impact that here represents an exogenous cause of change.

    Schmoller expresses the concept at some length in his book, partially published in English in B1 B2 Figure 2. One naturally begins, therefore, by thinking of the various ways in which men have hitherto attempted to picture to themselves the development of the nations, and thereby to comprehend it in a complete theory.

    They have either fastened upon the parallel between the life of a people and the life of an individual; or they have conceived of a series of stages, in which 1 pastoral life, 2 agriculture, 3 industry, and 4 trade, or a barter, b the use of currency, and c trade resting upon credit, have followed one another in orderly succession. These are conceptions which do, indeed, each take hold of one portion of the contents of the process of economic evolution, and for the comparison with one another of many periods and communities they are appropriate enough; but [. Schmoller clarifies that the cause of any traffic and any trade is the difference of natural treasuries of the land, the diversity of men and of their needs, and the division of labor.

    No exchange can take place due to insufficient variability of endowments and needs within the kinship. Only different tribes occasionally exchange a few goods, mostly on occasion of religious meetings. This late evolution was caused mainly by the absence of adequate infrastructure. It was only after the process of national unification in various countries that state power promoted the infrastructure and legal reforms necessary for countrywide trade.

    The promotion of national interests then supports the subsequent development of intercontinental trade based mainly on navigation. On the other hand, communication and transport technology evolved through stages as well. As mentioned, navigation had already reached an advanced level of technical development centuries before Christ the first stage.

    Long roads were built by the Chinese, the Arabs and the Incas, and the Romans developed a capillary mail system to sustain their administrative and military machine the second stage. Between the s and s a system of smooth wooden roads was developed, connecting caves and mines to factories and allowing horses to pull heavier loads.

    Finally, from the nineteenth century railroads made passenger and freight transport exponentially faster and cheaper the third stage. While the first two stages developed chiefly out of military and state policies, this later evolution was driven mainly by the profit motive. Thus, while the evolution of trade affects technological development, and conversely technology makes trade possible, each phenomenon requires variable amounts of time and a variable number of stages for development, as well as a number of other exogenous preconditions for example political to be met.

    In summary, there can be no doubt that no previous thinker would have maintained that all social evolutions took place at the same pace. Part II Difference, behavior and aggregative analysis 3 Social sciences and the act of classification From the methodological point of view, three issues are most connected to the topic of diversity: These relevant differences imply that the individuals objects of analysis should be investigated separately.

    First, the ceteris paribus clause implicit in any theoretical analysis amounts to dismissing as uniform all those differences that are not made explicit. Thus, all persons are grouped within a same class with respect to these discarded variables. Two connected issues arise as a consequence: What is thus the implied place of economics within the social sciences, and its relation with the neighboring disciplines of sociology, anthropology, and similar? Both Mill and Schmoller wrote specifically on the method and scientific process of political economy.

    As Mill writes in Logic: It is an operation which precedes all induction, and supplies it with its materials. Rather, they held that the necessary hypotheses should in turn be based upon both previous observation and relevant theories of the past. As a consequence, scientific investigation emerges as a circular process, or rather, if we admit that there can be scientific progress, as a spiral.

    Specifically concerning political economy, contrary to the view that depicts Mill as advocating an axiomatic deductive science we are able find several passages in which he expresses in unconditional terms the concept that even deduction must rest on previous observation. Definition and classification are intermediate passages of scientific enquiry. They should be developed with the aim to rationalize the induction process, and in turn they constitute the subject matter the hypotheses of the following deductive process.

    As mentioned, they are also inevitable steps of enquiry since simultaneous consideration of all individuals and their peculiarities is ruled out on the basis of proving too extensive an activity, one beyond human capacity. As mentioned, classification of individual cases implies a selection of the subject matter to be tackled by the following analysis. Most of the time, as mentioned in Chapter 1, these forms of difference may all indeed be termed under the collective label of heterogeneity. Mill and Schmoller clearly argued for and applied in their own work a mixture of methodological individualism and aggregate analysis, depending on the issue concerned.

    The idea that economic life has ever been a process mainly dependent on individual action — an idea based on the impression that it is concerned merely with methods of satisfying individual needs — is mistaken with regard to all stages of human civilization, and in some respects it is more mistaken the further we go back. Moreover, the use of aggregates for the sake of analysis does not even imply the scientific, much less the political, priority of such aggregates over individuals. However, it is also clear that to Schmoller these results are but the intermediate means to secure a better standard of living for the largest strata of the population; that is, of each citizen taken individually, whose welfare is the ultimate goal of policy and the final standard of moral judgment.

    Indeed, they implied that it should always be abstractly possible to represent, or at least theoretically to treat the former by means of the latter, although this process is in general unnecessary. In fact, the use of aggregates for the sake of analysis does not necessarily even imply their actual existence.

    Positions differed down to the smallest detail, but on the whole we may distinguish two opposing schools: The problem of classification with which we are concerned here is different from that of universals because it does not relate to the fields of metaphysics or ontology, but rather epistemology. That is, the legitimacy of the use of collective entities within scientific analysis is an issue partly unrelated to that of their objective existence. Having attested that both Schmoller and Mill considered their use as legitimate and indeed sensible, their opinions differed to a certain extent concerning this second point, as illustrated in the next two paragraphs.

    They do not refer to the collective of individuals, which he conceives to exist only individually. Still, the question remains as to whether these common attributes actually exist, as opposed to their being a creation of the scientist. On this point, Mill believes that some classifications are in fact inspired by reality as it straightforwardly appears to everyone; in a sense they exist independently of the specific observer.

    In the case of political economy, a convenient example is that of social class. Hence, independent of the problem of the existence of collective entities, from the epistemological point of view individuals and social classes can be the objects of separate analyses, being as there is no biunivocal relationship between the two. What is here meant by importance?

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    It has reference to the end in view; and the same objects, therefore, may admit with propriety of several different classifications. This tendency is perhaps even amplified in his economic works, due to his methodological position of stressing the nature of political economy as a mainly deductive science. In Principles Mill identifies two distinct and independent taxonomies of social class.

    The other definition of class is basically expressed in terms of the political language common after the experience of the French Revolution, of utopian socialism and of Radicalism and Chartism in England. Thus they constitute a single class, within which it is impossible to draw dividing lines when proposals of policy reform are discussed. However, in general the scientist is not absolutely free to define and classify at will.

    This requirement implies that with the aim of formulating a certain law to synthesize an empirical regularity, the collection of units of analysis should be partitioned into as many classes as are needed to prevent the emergence of a violation of the law: From this perspective, if methodological individualism implies the definition of a law that supposedly applies to each single unit, it does not correspond to a classless analysis, but to an analysis at the maximum possible level of aggregation; that is, of a single class.

    Indeed, Principles includes both fields art and science of political economy. Mill writes in his Autobiography that Principles was, from the first, continually cited and referred to as an authority, because it was not a book merely of abstract science, but also of application, and treated Political Economy not as a thing in itself, but as a fragment of a greater whole; a branch of Social Philosophy, so interlinked with all the other branches, that its conclusions, even in its own peculiar province, are only true conditionally.

    Mill for recognizing that: Mill usually uses this to refer to the science of political economy; that is, excluding the art or application of it. Schmoller did not consider this distinction, possibly because it is made explicit in Logic and not in the short essay specifically devoted to the method of political economy. However, he would probably have objected to such a distinction as it implies a greater separation of the social sciences than the one he proposed.

    As he had already highlighted in the midst of the Methodenstreit, what he objected to was: That is, he mainly considers the issue a matter of practice and experience, in which a certain theoretical eclecticism should be conjoined with practical sense. By contrast, Schmoller holds that theoretical analysis cannot dispense itself from the knowledge of the state of advancement of the other disciplines, and most notably it cannot lose sight of the general aim of mutual consistency among the social sciences. Not only in the straightforward negative sense, that the instrumental nature of classifications cannot be stretched to the point of developing implausible social groupings.

    There is not, as however the Historical School maintained, an objective popular spirit independent of individuals, overarching them and mystically reigning upon them; just as there is not a superior general will, as Rousseau dreamt about. There is in every people a series of spheres of consciousness, coordinated, each determining the other, tending to a certain unity. Schmoller frequently notes that many human activities are undertaken not by single individuals but by a group that, with respect to that activity, can therefore be considered a coherent whole.

    Second, there are the economic activities of production and consumption. These concern groups of people increasingly, the more technology fails to allow for individual provision for all our needs, and the more we look back in history: The most primitive tribe of hunters or shepherds maintains its existence only by means of an organization based on kinship, wherein union for purposes of defense, joint journeyings to summer and winter pastures, communistic acquisition for the benefit of the whole tribe, communistic guidance by the tribal prince play the most important parts.

    However, institutions exhibit a further characteristic that Schmoller describes with a definition in parallel to the previous one; that is, they physically exist as forms of social life, embodied by the persons who take part in them. However, neither Schmoller nor Mill let his political aims determine the content, or the method, of his analysis. The compatibility of similar methodologies with such different political ideologies is an instance of the neutrality of the use of classification and of the subsequent aggregate analyses with respect to their political implications.

    This observation was no surprise to Mill and Schmoller. By rejecting methodological universalism, both writers conceived of individuals as the only agents of social change and yet they frequently employed aggregate analysis. Thus, it seems necessary to investigate their theories of behavior, and in particular how they were able to conciliate notions of individual and aggregate behavior. As it turns out, the analyses of behavior by the two authors can be considered as complementary.

    He assumed that behavior can be directed by modifying incentives and constraints because he was dealing specifically with the criticism of contemporaneous traditional English law, and his main aim was to put forward a comprehensive reform of penal law. In this context, incentives and constraints are almost the only tools available to the legislator. Hence, this section of argument proves relevant indirectly to clarify the methodological approach underlying the applied analysis presented in Chapters 12 and As mentioned, Mill assumed that behavior is a hypothesis for political economy; hence it is a static element of the analysis whose development is not denied, but left for the study of other disciplines psychology and ethology.

    However, a complete description of his own position can be inferred from frequent reference to related matters. Of the different forms of pleasure that happiness is composed of intellectual pleasure, bodily pleasure, spiritual pleasure, etc. Three factors prevent its complete suitability: Second, many options are deemed to be incomparable even within the same form of pleasure for example, different sources of the kind of pleasure arising from pride or the kind of pain arising from shame.

    Using modern terminology, while the former point concerned the possibility of comparing different feelings of pleasure and pain, thus leading to many utility functions for each individual, or rather a multidimensional one, the present one concerns the comparability of the arguments of a same dimension of the subjective utility function. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.

    It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone. Or simply stating that all action is the result of Will, which amounts to a tautology given the previous definition of Will.

    However, he also notices that employing in scientific discourse a term drawn from the common language but with a different and overlapping meaning is not a theoretically neutral procedure: This amounts to a descriptively untenable hypothesis, at times discarded by Bentham himself: This, as a universal truth, can in no way be maintained. Mill attributes a crucial role to naming and precise definition in science — that of a preliminary step for any subsequent reasoning: He dedicates the first three chapters of Logic to the issue, because he deems confusion as to what the object of analysis really is to be a major source of scientific error.

    We should, if possible, give the words such a meaning, that the propositions in which people are accustomed to use them, shall as far as possible still be true; and that the feelings habitually excited by them, shall be such as the things to which we mean to appropriate them ought to excite. Concerning DUT, Mill criticizes both the aforementioned hypotheses. With respect to the first hypothesis 1. First, he deems it patently partial and possibly misleading, to the extent that interest is not even the main determinant of behavior: It would be more correct to say that conduct is sometimes determined by an interest, that is, by a deliberate and conscious aim; and sometimes by an impulse, that is, by a feeling [.

    Following a tradition dating back at least to Aristotle, Mill requires that we consider the many forms of pleasures not only as qualitatively different, but as hierarchically ordered — both in a moral and in a hedonistic sense. In the end Bentham developed a theory of behavior already dissatisfactory with respect to the standard of his time. So long as a distinction was finally drawn between pious behavior — relevant to religious judgment — and the other spheres of human life, authors were increasingly ready to recognize a multiplicity of passions and interests that constitute desire.

    Mill also rejects the second hypothesis of DUT 1. This is most evident when he moves from criticism to positive descriptions of behavior. However, the scientist can fruitfully seek out those interests, desires and aversions most likely affected by a certain policy or institution under scrutiny.